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Syrians currently comprise the largest group of refugees worldwide, with 
the number of people who have fled the country totalling nearly five mil-
lion. Although hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees landed in Europe 
in 2015, the vast majority have remained in the immediate vicinity of their 
home country in the Middle East. In the main receiving countries, they are 
in urgent need of conflict-sensitive assistance.
 •  Jordan has taken in more Syrian refugees, in relation to the number of its in-
habitants, than has Turkey, but far fewer than Lebanon. From a legal point of 
view, these refugees in Jordan live in an uncertain limbo between temporary 
protection and structural marginalisation.
 •  Within Jordan, the majority of Syrians live in the capital of Amman and in the 
border towns and communities of the north, while a significantly smaller por-
tion lives in the official refugee camps. In addition, some tens of thousands of 
refugees are subsisting in makeshift refugee camps without any aid or infra-
structure. They are located in the no man’s land between the Jordanian, Syrian, 
and Iraqi borders. 
 •  In northern Jordanian cities such as Mafraq, property owners and local entre-
preneurs are profiting from the presence of refugees and the influx of inter-
national aid money. However, the Syrians and many Jordanians are suffering 
from the subsequent price increases and the tight labour and housing markets.
 •  This situation harbours potential for conflict, since the competitive climate on 
the ground could deepen prejudices between Jordanians and Syrians. However, 
apart from a few exceptions, the existing tensions have not escalated into vio-
lence so far. 
Policy Implications
The ongoing war in Syria is making the return of the refugees in the foreseeable 
future unlikely. Since European countries, including Germany, are not willing 
to grant protection to a larger number of Syrian refugees, the host countries in 
the region are in dire need of a substantial increase in international aid. In this 
context, the heterogeneous reality of Syrians living in Jordan – be it in cities, vil-
lages, or camps – should be given more consideration.
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“An Era of Total Mobility”
The united Nations Refugee Agency reported in its Global Trends report of 20 June 
2016 that 65.3 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced in the year 2015. 
This figure was thus more than 60 million for the first time in history (UNHCR 
2016). Against this background, united Nations High commissioner for Refugees 
Filippo Grandi spoke of “an era of total mobility” (Tagesschau 2016). Of the number 
of  forcibly displaced persons documented by the uNHcR in 2015, almost two-thirds 
(40.8 million) were “internally displaced persons” (IDP), meaning that they had left 
their immediate home but had not crossed any state borders. At 21.3 million, one-
third of the forcibly displaced persons in 2015 were refugees within the meaning of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”) and the 1967 Protocol 
because they had traversed a state border. According to the Protocol, a refugee is any 
person who has “a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion [...] outside 
the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country“ (Convention, Art. 1.2). Refugees un-
der the international-law meaning of the convention have a right to international 
 protection.
This global development of a rapid increase in the number of refugees crossing 
state borders on the one hand and of more IDPs on the other hand echoes the trend 
among the largest single group of forcibly displaced persons today: Syrians after the 
beginning of the war in 2011. At the end of 2015, approximately 6.6 million of Syr-
ia’s total population of nearly 23 million people were IDPs (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre 2016). Approximately 40 per cent of Syrians currently living 
in Syria have fled at least once, some even several times, within their home coun-
try. These figures come on top of the extremely high number of people, between 
300,000 and 500,000, who have died in the war in Syria. 
The uN Refugee Agency puts the number of registered Syrian refugees at the 
end of 2015 at 4.8 million (UNHCR 2016: 16). However, the number of unregis-
tered refugees residing outside their home country is estimated to be significantly 
higher. This can be illustrated with the case of Lebanon, which currently hosts ap-
proximately 1.1 million Syrian refugees registered by the UNHCR, although other 
estimates put this number at 2 million. This makes Lebanon the country that has, 
per capita of its own population (4.5 million inhabitants), taken in the largest refu-
gee population in the world (Lenner and Schmelter 2016) – estimates vary between 
one-quarter and one-half of its total population. If applied to Germany, this would 
correspond to some 20 to 40 million refugees.
In absolute numbers, Turkey is the main receiving country for Syrian refugees. 
By January 2016, the uNHcR counted nearly 2.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey 
(Bank and Schmelter 2016: 103). Although the migration of hundreds of thousands 
Syrians in 2015 to Europe, and in particular to Germany and Sweden, was a new and 
significant development, it pales in comparison to the numbers of Syrian refugees 
taken in by Syria’s Middle Eastern neighbours.
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Jordan as a Typical Host Country 
In Jordan, the uNHcR had registered some 650,000 Syrians as refugees by the sum-
mer of 2016. By contrast, the monarchy under King Abdullah II has estimated the 
number of Syrians living in Jordan at up to 1.4 million, claiming that some 750,000 
Syrians were already living in Jordan before the war began in 2011. However, this fig-
ure is likely to be too high, especially since the Jordanian authorities had never, prior 
to 2011, reported that three-quarters of a million Syrians were living in their country. 
Nor have King Abdullah II or Jordanian officials offered explanations for how this 
high figure of unregistered Syrians was assessed and calculated. Nonetheless, the 
proportion of the Jordanian population that is comprised of Syrians is currently esti-
mated to be between one-tenth and one-sixth. With a total population of 9.2 million, 
Jordan has indeed taken in fewer Syrian refugees than Lebanon; however, in relative 
terms it has taken in more than Turkey (Lenner and Schmelter 2016).
due to its location in the heart of the Middle East, and because of its relative 
political stability, Jordan has already been a host country for refugees from neigh-
bouring Arab countries for some time. For example, the country hosts some 2.1 mil-
lion refugees from Palestine, who came mainly as a result of the Arab–Israeli wars 
of 1948 and 1967. As a result of the Gulf War of 1990/1991 and the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have also temporarily or permanently 
settled in  Jordan (Bank 2010: 171 ff.). In addition, Jordan has smaller refugee com-
munities from other war-torn countries in the broader region, such as Sudan, So-
malia, and more recently Yemen and Libya. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands 
of migrant workers – mainly from Egypt, Sudan, and South and Southeast Asian 
countries – are living in the country.
The Jordanian monarchy has signed neither the 1951 Refugee convention nor 
the 1967 Protocol. With regard to the refugees from Syria, Jordan is cooperating 
with the UNHCR on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)  created 
in 1998 and renewed in 2014. Under the MoU, the UNHCR can grant Syrians wish-
ing to register in Jordan a temporary six-month residence permit, and thus a revo-
cable protection status. on that basis, registered Syrian refugees in Jordan have the 
right to food assistance, subsidised healthcare, and limited access to state educa-
tional institutions for an initial six months. Between 2011 and 2013, the Jordanian 
authorities extended these six-month residence permits without major restrictions, 
thereby providing continued access to subsidised healthcare. However, Syrian re-
fugees have no legal claim to such services after the six-month period. Indeed, 
since November 2014, healthcare for Syrian refugees staying beyond the six-month 
period has been provided only by non-governmental relief organisations (Carrion 
2016). In addition, the Jordanian authorities can de jure expel the refugees after 
their six-month protection status expires. Although the government has done so 
only in very few cases so far, it does leave Syrian refugees in a permanent condition 
of uncertainty (Carrion 2016; Bank and Schmelter 2016). 
The Social Structure and Distribution of Syrian Refugees in Jordan
Most Syrians in Jordan are lower- and middle-class Sunni Arabs. Since 2011, the 
majority of refugees have fled as families, resulting in a high number of minors. 
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Many of them come from southern Syria, especially from the region of daraa, where 
the uprising against the authoritarian regime of President Bashar al-Assad was ini-
tiated in mid-March 2011. With the expansion of the war in Syria, refugees then 
increasingly began coming from other parts of Syria to Jordan: from the surround-
ing areas of the capital Damascus (Rif Dimashq), from the area around the central 
Syrian cities of Homs and Hama, and from the northern city of Aleppo.
Most refugees from Syria could not be categorised as belonging to any one of 
the dominant political camps of the Syria conflict. [1] If anything, there are sympa-
thies for the secular and moderate-Islamist opposition or for the Free Syrian Army. 
There is no reliable data about how many of the refugees sympathise with the As-
sad regime or with jihadist terror organisations such as the Nusra Front (Jabhat 
al-Nusra), the Syrian al-Qa’ida offshoot, and the so-called Islamic State. The clear 
majority of Syrians living in Jordan are apparently war refugees and not “refugee 
warriors.”
Although few reliable data are available on their exact geographic-demographic 
distribution, it has been shown that in 2016 the largest group of Syrians – approxi-
mately 400,000 people – were living in the agglomeration of the capital Amman, a 
city of four million inhabitants. It is unclear how many of these Syrians came there 
as a consequence of the war and how many were already there before 2011. How-
ever, the majority of Syrian refugees have settled in the communities and refugee 
camps in northern Jordan near the border with Syria, especially in the governorates 
of Irbid and Mafraq. In some places they now constitute the majority.  
The Situation in the Zaatari and Rukban Refugee Camps
Unlike the case in Lebanon, the Jordanian authorities have set up five official ref-
ugee camps for Syrians who fled after 2011: Zaatari, Azraq, King Abdullah Park, 
 Cyber City, and Zarqa (Turner 2015; Bank and Schmelter 2016: 107–111). Together, 
these camps were estimated to host approximately 200,000 refugees in early sum-
mer 2016 – in other words, less than one-third of the Syrian refugees registered by 
UNHCR and significantly less than the estimated 400,000 living in the cities and 
towns in northern Jordan.
In July 2012, the largest and most well-known refugee camp – Zaatari – opened 
its doors just 10 kilometres from Mafraq, the capital of the governorate of the same 
name. In 2012 and 2013, it was home to 200,000 people, a number that has since 
gradually decreased to about 80,000. The Jordanian monarchy under King Ab-
dullah II has a vested interest in preventing this number of “highly visible” refu-
gees from shrinking, as this could lead to cuts to Jordan’s entitlement to benefits. 
 Early on at Zaatari, a variety of international and local NGOs cooperating with the 
 UNHCR took over the delivery of the aid programmes (Tobin 2016; Sullivan and 
Simpson 2016). The Jordanian authorities are responsible only for controlling ac-
cess to the camps through the use of security offiers (Tobin 2016: 5). Entering and 
especially exiting the refugee camps has become much more difficult since 2015. 
Residents apprehended by Jordanian security forces outside the camp are arrested 
and may be deported to Syria. [2]
In addition to the official refugee camps, a series of “wild camps” has also de-
veloped since 2014. These lie in an inhospitable desert in the no man’s land of the 
1 Conversations held by 
the author with different 
Syrians in northern Jordan 
in April 2016 in the context 
of the research project 
“Neben-Kriegsschauplätze: 
Der Syrienkrieg in Jor-
danien” (Secondary Thea-
tres of War: The Syrian War 
in Jordan).
2 Oral communication on 
site with the author.
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Jordanian–Syrian–Iraqi border triangle, far away from larger settlements or in-
frastructure and basic services. Together they are also referred to as “the berm,” 
after the piled-up sand wall stretching over nearly 100 kilometres that separates 
this area from  Syrian territory. In July 2016, between 65,000 and 100,000 refu-
gees were estimated to be subsisting behind the sand wall in makeshift tent set-
tlements. [3] Many of them have fled the fighting around the northern Syrian city of 
Aleppo, which has escalated massively since 2015; another large group comes from 
the territory of the so-called Islamic State (IS), which is becoming increasingly bru-
tal against civilians (Rosiny 2016).
Since spring 2016, the Jordanian authorities have been letting small contin-
gents of those stranded in the berm enter the country, albeit following intensive 
and lengthy searches of their person. Most of these people have been sent to the 
Azraq camp, which was already accommodating 50,000 Syrians at the end of June 
2016 and was thus faced with an increase of 20,000 refugees within weeks. The 
situation within the sand wall has further deteriorated since 21 June 2016, when 
a terrorist attack in Rukban allegedly perpetrated by the IS killed seven Jordanian 
border guards. Thereafter, the Jordanian security authorities declared the whole 
border area a closed military zone. At the end of 2013, and again in the course of 
2014, the Jordanian government had already closed the border in the western parts 
of the country for fear of an infiltration of jihadist terrorist organisations, in par-
ticular the IS and the Nusra Front. This de facto border closure means that Syrian 
refugees have had absolutely no way of getting to Jordan for over two years. In ad-
dition, after the terrorist attack, the provision supply system for those stranded in 
the berm collapsed. Human rights and humanitarian organisations have criticised 
the Jordanian government for this de facto punishment of refugees, since they have 
essentially fled from the same perpetrators who killed the Jordanian border guards. 
In spite of all this, the inhumane handling of forcibly displaced persons in the Jor-
danian–Syrian no man’s land continues. 
The Transformation of Mafraq
For the Syrian residents of northern Jordanian cities and communities, the situa-
tion is not as acutely life-threatening as for unregistered refugees in Rukban and 
other wild encampments, which have developed spontaneously and very provision-
ally since 2014. In these cities and communities, the refugees and other cross-bor-
der effects of the Syrian war have considerably changed the socio-economic condi-
tions of life for the people. This transformation of border areas is best illustrated 
using the example of Mafraq, a conservative city in northern Jordan that is based 
on traditional agriculture and trade with Iraq. The city’s population has doubled 
to 200,000 inhabitants since the beginning of the Syrian war, due to the influx 
of approximately 100,000 Syrians. As a result of this rapid growth, the Jordanian 
state has a stronger local presence there than ever before, in the form of a security 
force made up of the police, the gendarmerie, and secret service agents. due to the 
population increase, Mafraq now needs more local government services, such as 
water, electricity, healthcare, and waste disposal. While the security measures are 
subject to the control of the authoritarian monarchy, the municipal administration 
of Mafraq relies heavily on international donor institutions for the financing of ser-
3 For the estimate of 
65,000 Syrians, see: Mc-
Neill, Sophie (2016), “Hu-
manitarian Groups calling 
on Jordanian government 
to urgently unblock aid to 
65,000 Syrian refugees,” 
7 July, online: www.abc.
net.au/news/2016-07-08/
calls-for-jordan-to-unblock-
aid-to-65000-syrian-
refugees/7579468 (19 July 
2016). For the estimate 
of 100,000 Syrians, see: 
Middle East Eye (2016), 
“Jordan agrees one-off 
aid for 100,000 Syrians 
blocked at border,” UN, 
online: www.mid-
dleeasteye.net/fr/news/
jordan-agrees-one-aid-
100000-syrians-blocked-
border-un-islamic-state-
refugees-humanitarian-aid-
border-530930124 (19 July 
2016).
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vices. The municipality of Mafraq itself does not generate sufficient revenue – for 
instance, through taxation – nor does it receive even remotely enough funds from 
the notoriously strapped Jordanian government budget. [4]
However, the survival of refugees is more dependent on the performance of 
international organisations than on the financing of municipal services, since the 
vast majority of Syrians living in Jordan depend on aid. Yet aid agencies often have 
difficulty reaching the needy with appropriate means. In addition, they often oper-
ate from Amman, which is two hours away by car. This has led to the development 
of assistance measures that are pragmatic but nonetheless hardly adapted to the 
local circumstances. For example, in Mafraq aid organisations have taken to paying 
the rent of large families for half a year, thereby securing them a common abode 
at least for a certain period of time. After the six-month period that concludes the 
temporary legal status of Syrian refugees, the situation is again uncertain: Will the 
family’s rent continue to be financed? Can the family remain in the apartment with-
out paying rent, seeing that Syrian refugees have no legal means to earn money 
without a Jordanian work permit? Or must they vacate the apartment? Moreover, if 
a family manages to cover the rent, they still face a series of other challenges such as 
obtaining sufficient staple foods, health services, and basic education. These ques-
tions underscore the precarious conditions in which many Syrians in Mafraq live 
despite international aid.
Such international aid practices have fundamentally changed the local economy 
of Mafraq: First, they have led to massive price increases in rents, such that it is not 
uncommon for apartments to rent for five to seven times the former market price. 
This situation is detrimental not only to Syrians once their rental subsidy expires 
but also to many poorer Jordanians living in the structurally weak Mafraq. Many of 
them are forced to move into smaller or substandard dwellings or to share a dwell-
ing with a greater number of people. on the other hand, the rental price bubble has 
produced profiteers, including the property owners, who are reaping immense prof-
its. In Mafraq they often belong to the extended families that are politically linked 
with the monarchy. Landowners likewise benefit, since the resulting construction 
boom has developers vying to buy any leftover land. Also, restaurants and retail 
stores are doing better than in the past. While Mafraq was largely without cafes and 
restaurants before 2011, the influx of tens of thousands of Syrians has meant that 
many new ones have opened up.
However, the few Jordanian profiteers are juxtaposed with the many residents 
who feel like they are losing out as a result of this development. The less affluent 
Jordanians thus express their displeasure at no longer being able to afford life “in 
their city.” This is accompanied by prejudices about (perceived) privileges given to 
Syrians – for example, regarding the temporary rentals provided by international 
aid organisations. Furthermore, some Jordanians criticise Syrians as threatening 
their jobs, since the latter are willing to work for much lower wages. Indeed, many 
Syrians in Mafraq are pursuing informal employment without a work permit. How-
ever, the types of jobs they do, such as working as harvest helpers or in textile facto-
ries in the nearby special economic zone, are generally not taken up by Jordanians 
anyway. What can primarily be observed in and around Mafraq is a partial eco-
nomic displacement of non-Jordanian foreign workers by Syrian workers. 
despite such prejudices against Syrians, the situation in Mafraq has thus far 
not escalated violently, apart from a few exceptions. Some Jordanian residents of 
4 Interview with Ahmad 
Hawamdeh, mayor (ra’is 
al-baladiya) of Mafraq, 4 
April 2016.
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the city had, as a protest action in 2013, imitated a small refugee camp with their 
own tents. But this action was directed primarily against the inaction of the Jorda-
nian authorities. In 2015, a Jordanian killed a Syrian as a result of a theft (Sullivan 
and Simpson 2016: 18). However, such isolated incidents have not, so far, led to the 
escalation of violence between groups. This can be largely attributed to the massive 
presence of Jordanian security forces. At the same time, many Jordanians are also 
empathetic towards Syrians, knowing that they are victims of a brutal war and have 
experienced great suffering. 
Ramping Up Aid, Recognising Local Differences
In summary, it can be said that the arrival of many Syrians and the practices of 
international refugee aid have led to a strong socio-economic transformation in 
northern Jordan. With the exception of a few local profiteers, many Jordanians 
have been structurally marginalised. This situation harbours a medium-term po-
tential for conflict, although this has not yet escalated into violent actions.
The ongoing war in Syria is making the return of the refugees impossible in the 
foreseeable future. Against this background, the refusal of European countries, in-
cluding Germany, to grant protection to a larger number of Syrian refugees is highly 
problematic and deplorable, as is the fact that the rich Gulf countries have only re-
ceived a very small number of Syrian refugees. Thus, substantial increases in inter-
national financial assistance for the main host countries Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, 
and also Iraq are imperative. When implementing such measures, efforts should be 
made to ensure that, unlike in the past (such as at the “Supporting Syria and the 
Region” conference of 4 February 2016 in London), money is not only promised 
but also actually paid. The underfunding of the uNHcR and the uN World Food 
Programme in 2015, as a result of which relief efforts in Jordan and Lebanon had to 
be reduced in the short term by up to 30 per cent, are cautionary examples. The re-
duction in aid payments led to a significant worsening of the provision of services to 
the refugees in the host countries and contributed to the decision of many Syrians 
in the spring and summer of 2015 to embark towards Europe despite the perilous 
escape routes.
A significant increase in the quantity and dependability of the international 
aid funds is a necessary condition for the sustainable improvement of the refugees’ 
situation in the Middle Eastern host countries. However, what is also important 
is to adapt the provision of services to the local conditions and the heterogeneous 
reality of life on the ground. While the Syrians living in the unofficial camps such as 
Rukban require immediate emergency aid and basic supplies for survival, Syrians 
in the Zaatari camp need, aside from basic services, more support for education 
and training. Syrian children and young people in cities like Mafraq need to be bet-
ter integrated into the local school system, and adult Syrians must be given a work 
permit and the authorisation to engage in regulated, legal labour in order to liber-
ate themselves from dependence on precarious relief efforts in the medium term. 
International donor agencies should focus here on strengthening their assistance 
to Jordan.
undertaking such efforts will necessitate better cooperation between interna-
tional donors, Jordanian state institutions, and local partners. Indeed, only orches-
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trated collaboration will allow the parties involved to accomplish the mammoth 
task of providing for Syrian refugees in Jordan. 
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